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The
Markets
Watching Larry Kudlow recently on CNBC, we had the rather strange feeling that
he was the spokesperson on some sort of infomercial for lower interest rates.
One of his guests had just made a rather reasonable argument on interest rates,
one that we have made in the past. Nominal economic growth was running somewhere
around 8%, the guest said, and it was likely to stay at this level. The only
question to be resolved was how much would be inflation and how much would be
so-called "real growth". In the current strong growth and high commodity
price environment, the guest felt that inflation was likely to move higher.
This would lead to higher interest rates as the Fed "normalized" monetary
policy.
At this point, Larry quickly turned to his other guest for a more optimistic
read of the economic tea leaves. In what a lawyer might call "leading the
witness", Larry reamed off many statistics and acronyms which he felt were
germane to the discussion. "What's wrong with high real growth?" he
asked huffily. To paraphrase: "If the thing-a-ma-doodle and the watch-a-ma-call-it
combine with the low PCE ex everything that looks bad, why shouldn't interest
rates be low and the stock market be higher!"
That Larry, who was an economist of some repute earlier in his career, finds
it necessary to disparage those who have a more measured view of the financial
markets is not our point. We wonder why the prospect of higher interest rates
is so threatening to the political and economic "conservatives" that
they can't abide any serious discussion of the subject. The political right
has triumphed electorally in the United States by staying "on message".
Now the economic right seems to be attempting the same thing.
Inflation
is Causing Mr. Greenspan Concern
The
target of this message seems to be Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of the Federal
Reserve. Propaganda aside, how likely is it that Mr. Greenspan will be swayed
from his higher rate course? It is not too likely in our view. The following
chart shows "real" U.S. long term interest rates over the term of
Mr. Greenspan as Fed Chairman. A quick inspection shows that long term "real"
interest rates have only one way to go, and that is upwards. Long term real
interest rates were above 6% when Mr. Greenspan became the Fed's Chairman
in 1987. Since then, they have generally stayed in a band of 1% either side
of the mean of 3.6%. The current level of 1.6% is the low!
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Credit
Creationists
Low interest rates cause higher financial asset prices. Bonds, stocks, residential
housing, credit card receivables, home equity loans and other sundry leases
and loans have had their prices propelled upwards by low rates. Those reliant
on financial income have had to stretch for yield into arcane and risky securities
that depend on very low interest rates for their very existence.
The "credit creationists", the issuers, underwriters and traders of
these sliced and diced packages of risk, have profited immensely from the majestic
increase in financial asset values due to Mr. Greenspan's ultra low interest
rate policies. When financial receivables are valued at 4% discount rates, the
amount of asset backed securities based on these receivables is much greater
than at 8%. This excludes the "underwriting creep" of laxer lending
standards that requires less and less equity for the same loan amount.
Interest
Rate Succession Planning
Given the significant vested interest in maintaining a very low interest rate
policy, one must consider the possibility that Alan Greenspan might go with
the flow and keep his popular easy credit regime in place. The problem is
that his term as Federal Reserve Chairman expires in
January, 2006 and that he probably does not want to saddle his successor with
the problem of dealing with his massive credit expansion at the start of his
or her term. Given the nearly universal accolades for his stewardship of the
Fed, including a British knighthood, Mr. Greenspan clearly has some reputational
and political goodwill to spend. A continuation of his current tightening
of monetary policy is likely. Hopefully things will slow down by next January
and Sir Alan can leave office on an easing note.
"Dissing"
Saving
What we're sure of is that financial asset prices are very exposed to rising
interest rates. The Fed policy has been to lower interest rates to stimulate
economic activity. Borrowers have borrowed and lenders have lent to largely
finance consumption. This consumption boom in the U.S. has not only encouraged
spending instead of saving; it has encouraged net borrowing by consumers or
"dissaving", to use the modern economic euphemism.
The savings that funds investment in capital like factories and housing is
usually provided by those who forego consumption and retain part of their
income in the form of savings. Mr. Greenspan has stimulated U.S. consumers
very well. He has not only encouraged happy American consumers to use all
of their income for consumption, they have consumed more than their earnings.
They have done this by borrowing against their homes in record amounts. Falling
interest rates and the absence of prepayment penalties meant much higher loans
for the same carrying costs. Refinancing or "Refi" activity has
caused a huge increase in mortgage debt by American consumers which has been
used to finance consumption. A negative savings rate does not seem to bother
Wall Street's economists or Washington's politicians. The new economic rationale
for this credit binge hangs on the bizarre premise that since residential
real estate has increased in value more than the debt against it, this should
be counted as a form of savings.
Since U.S. governments and businesses have joined the borrowing spree, the
funding for the consumption by American consumers has not been provided by
fellow Americans, but has been provided by foreign central banks that have
financed the huge U.S. trade deficit. Their currency interventions to keep
the bottom from dropping out of the U.S. dollar are invested in the U.S. treasury
market. This has kept U.S. interest rates artificially low, since the Asian
central banks have been huge buyers of Treasuries. These "captive"
investors have also been buying massive amounts of bonds and Mortgage Backed
Securities issued by the U.S. Government Sponsored Agencies (GSEs) like Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac which has helped to refinance the "Refi" boom.
The increasingly public problems of the U.S. mortgage banks are not news to
our readers. The huge prepayment risk built into the $1.3 trillion mortgage
portfolio of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will have to be reckoned with. Mr
Greenspan himself said:
"It would be difficult, if not impossible to bail out the lenders, known
as government sponsored enterprises, should one get into financial trouble."
Risk is Percolating to the Surface of the Financial Markets
We are not economists or market strategists, but we know an overvalued market
when we see one. Risk has been far from investors' thoughts. As rates move
higher, receding credit will cause disruption in asset values and dislocation
in financial markets. Recently, the gritty reality of tighter money and higher
short term interest rates seems to have risk percolating towards the surface
of the world capital markets. The portents are there for those willing to
look.
Private equity and hedge funds have amassed billions of capital from institutional
investors anxious to find the high return investment promised land. Banks
are very willing to lend them their capital that they had carefully husbanded
a few years ago. It is not without a little irony that the financial press
lauded the recent huge Leveraged Buy Out (LBO) of SunGard, an investment technology
firm as the largest since the infamous RJR Nabisco LBO during the "greed
market" of the 1980s.
The potential downgrade of General Motors and its finance subsidiary has sent
its bond yields towards 10%. The spectacle of one of the largest bond issuers
in the United States losing its investment grade rating has sent a chill through
the corporate bond market. Bond portfolios that seemed safe a month ago now
don't seem quite as sure a thing. The easy money has been made for this cycle.
Investors expecting high returns are now about to experience high risk.
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