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The
impending removal of the Foreign Property Rule (FPR) has very interesting
implications for the structure and pricing of the Canadian capital markets.
While it should theoretically improve long term returns for Canadian investors,
we believe it will dramatically alter the longer term financing prospects
of Canadian issuers. All things being equal, the pricing of the securities
of larger Canadian issuers should fall into line with global peers. This
will remove the "Made in Canada" premium on the bonds and stocks
of many Canadian issuers. Diversification considerations and the structure
of the Canadian investment management industry could mean that securities
of Canadian companies with largely domestic operations could fall below
global valuation levels as Canadian institutional investors adjust their
portfolios to the new reality. This implies higher financing costs for
Canadian issuers. Removal of the FPR will also result in a reduction in
the profitability of Canadian financial institutions. Portfolio adjustment
to the FPR should be negative for Canadian investment dealers as Canadian
equity underwriting and trading declines. Asset management and trading
fees will decline as foreign investment managers are substituted for Canadian
investment managers in equity portfolios. The dominant position of Canadian
investment banks in the Canadian debt markets will be eroded by increased
investment by Canadians in the bonds of foreign issuers and increased
issuance by foreign entities in the Canadian dollar debt markets. Given
an extensive consultative process, we imagine that the complete removal
of the FPR would have provoked a massive lobbying effort against it by
those negatively affected, especially the Canadian banking sector. The
shocking speed of this development and the strong political support for
the budget in a minority Parliament make it very likely to pass. Thoughtful
investors will prepare for the new Canadian investment reality.
The
Canadian dollar bond universe under the Foreign Property Rule (FPR) was
a small and insulated place. Pension and RRSP registered accounts largely
used their scarce foreign property availability for foreign equities and
limited their bond managers to Canadian issuers. High Canadian real interest
rates meant Canadian bond market returns were excellent compared to foreign
markets, without the currency volatility. The performance experience of
foreign currency mandates and "currency overlays" was good on
paper but bad in practice. This kept sponsor mandates close to home in
Canadian currency and interest rates.
The
Foreign Property Rule (FPR) under the Canadian Income Tax Act distorted
the portfolios of Canadian retirement and pension funds by legally mandating
restrictions on the amount of foreign property that could be held by these
funds to 30%. The initial reasoning behind the FPR was to promote investment
by registered plans in Canadian securities in exchange for the deductibility
of contributions to these plans. Non-registered (and non-deductible) savings
and retirement plans have always been able to invest in foreign securities
without restriction. Registered plans operate under the FPR which was
raised from 10% to the current 30% over time as a result of lobbying by
the pension industry. The proposed federal budget provides for the complete
removal of the FPR. This has major consequences for the Canadian financial
markets.
Corporate finance theory tells us that companies should only retain their
cash flows if they have profitable projects to invest in. Otherwise they
should return the excess cash from their operations to their shareholders
to allow them to maximize their returns by reinvesting in other companies
that have profitable projects. A Canadian company that is able to find
profitable projects should be able to constantly reinvest in its own projects
and deliver retained earnings increases that will increase its share price
and credit ratings. There are many Canadian companies that have been able
to do this. These companies usually have large foreign investment bases.
Foreign investors like their prospects and often the Canadian capital
markets have been unable to completely fund the financing demands of these
issuers and they have financed abroad, particularly in the U.S. markets.
Theory also tells us that investors should raise their foreign investments
to increase their returns and lower their portfolio risk through diversification.
Registered Canadian investors could have already accomplished this under
the FPR by investing in Canadian companies with significant international
interests. In this case, the impact of the removal of the FPR would be
small. Canadian companies with profitable foreign operations are already
highly valued with significant foreign investment, especially in the technology
and resource sectors. The problem is that many large Canadian companies
have been unable to find profitable projects and they form large parts
of the Canadian equity and bond indices due to the artificial restriction
of the FPR. Why own the stocks and bonds of all five Canadian major banks
when better value and perhaps better managed foreign competitors beckon?
Canadian
Bonds Match Canadian Liabilities
Analysts have commented recently that in countries unconstrained by an
FPR, a "home preference" for pension funds seems to be to keep
50% in domestic assets. This makes sense since the liabilities of a pension
fund, its promise to pay pensions to its members, are denominated in its
home currency. A Canadian pension plan's liabilities are valued in Canadian
dollars using Canadian interest rates. Dropping interest rates and rising
liability values in the late 1990s now have pension plan sponsors considering
raising their fixed income weightings to "match" their liabilities
which are valued entirely in Canadian currency and interest rates.
The "asset planning" vogue of the 1990s, using historical returns
and correlations to establish policy asset mix, increased pension plan
equity exposure towards 70% at the expense of fixed income which dropped
towards 30%. The consensus strong returns forecast for foreign equity
markets, their Canadian liabilities and the good historical returns from
Canadian fixed investments caused plan sponsors to substitute foreign
for Canadian equities as the FPL increased from 10% to 30%. This makes
for a "normal" policy asset mix of 40% Canadian equities, 30%
foreign equities and 30% in fixed income.
This already high equity weighting of most Canadian pension plans make
it difficult to cut back their Canadian fixed income exposure. It is also
unlikely that plan sponsors will take advantage of the dropping of the
foreign property limits to make substantial investments in foreign currency
bond issues. Indeed, Canadian plan sponsors have been able to invest in
foreign currency bond issues of Canadian issuers for many years. The poor
returns and volatility of foreign currency bond mandates relative to Canadian
fixed income mandates have not made this an attractive asset class.
Canadian Equities Will Be Under Pressure
We believe that pension sponsors will adjust to the FPR removal by moving
their foreign equities significantly higher at the expense of Canadian
equities. Based on their heavy exposures to recent "Made in Canada"
disasters like Laidlaw, Loewen, Bre-X and Nortel, which formed a significant
part of the Canadian equity universe, pension plan sponsors clearly understand
the benefits of global equity diversification. At the height of the 2000
technology speculation, Nortel was over 20% of the widely used TSE 300
benchmark index. Sponsors might choose to hedge the currency risk, as
many currently do, but they will be selling Canadian equities in favour
of foreign equities. Canadian equity issuers will be affected differentially
by this substitution of foreign equities for Canadian equities as sponsors
adjust to the world after repeal of the FPR.
Canadian commodity producers already sell most of their output on the
global markets and operate internationally. Foreign investors have long
owned Alcan, Inco and other Canadian companies for their resource bases.
These stocks already trade relative to their global peers and the prospects
for the global economy. The change in the FPR should have little effect
on them. It is the large capitalization and lower prospect companies with
largely Canadian operations that will bear the brunt of the change. Canadian
banks, utilities, and telephone companies will see their valuations move
into line with their global peers. Diversification also dictates that
Canadian investors should prefer foreign companies at the same valuations
as their Canadian equivalents to reduce their exposure to the Canadian
economy.
Safe
But Sorry
Bell Canada Enterprises (BCE), the widely held telephone conglomerate,
has been the historically safe but sorry choice for FPR restricted Canadian
investors. BCE will likely suffer in comparison to its global peers. The
FPR kept Canadian investors captive in this telephone giant that has had
a penchant for investing its relatively safe cash flows in ill advised
and loss generating diversifications like its 1980s ill-fated Daon real
estate play and Teleglobe, its 1990s global long distance loser.
The affected Canadian companies could even cheapen more than theoretically
should be the case as the initial phase of portfolio restructuring takes
place. Many Canadian institutional investors are over invested in equity
sectors that form a large part of the S&P TSX index but are a smaller
proportion of foreign and global indices.
The current structure of the Canadian investment management industry will
make the transition problematic. Institutional clients and their consultants
usually "benchmark" their fund exposures to "asset classes"
and then hire specialist managers for each asset class. A typical investment
policy would see Canadian equity managers limited to Canadian equities
benchmarked against the S&P TSX index and foreign equity managers
managing foreign portfolios against foreign equity benchmarks such as
the EAFE or S&P 500 indices.
Institutional clients could give their Canadian equity managers the ability
to invest in foreign equities. It is more likely that they will take assets
from their Canadian equity managers and increase their foreign equity
exposure with their existing international managers. Most Canadian plan
sponsors went through the process of selecting international managers
in the 1990s as the FPR moved up to 30% and they largely chose foreign
investment managers. They are comfortable with these managers and more
importantly are at the low end of their fee schedules. Additional funding
to their existing international managers will be the cheapest way for
sponsors to increase their foreign equity allocations. This will require
Canadian equity managers to sell Canadian stocks to fund the investment
in foreign equities with the foreign managers. Even if this portfolio
restructuring is done through derivatives, it will essentially involve
the sale of Canadian stocks and the purchase of foreign stocks.
As Canadian investors increase their benchmark weightings in foreign equities,
the shift will be massive. Indexed sellers will be selling $240 million
of Canadian bank stocks for every $1 billion they invest in the Morgan
Stanley Europe, Asia and Far East (EAFE) index which does not include
Canadian stocks. Implementation of this shift could be problematic. Clients
could implement the change by transferring the Canadian stock portfolio
to a foreign manager and allow replacement of the domestic stocks over
time when superior foreign opportunities are available. They could also
gradually lower the weighting in Canadian equities over time to avoid
disruption. Our many years of managing money convince us that this "gradualist
approach" is unlikely to happen.
The potential for large changes in relative valuations and the amounts
of assets involved make "sooner" better than "later".
Pension plan sponsors and their consultants will be able to quickly adapt
their benchmark portfolios without the FPR constraint using their asset
planning software. The portfolio shifts involved will be taken out of
the hands of the portfolio managers and given to the "portfolio implementation"
specialists, largely out of New York, who handle the transitions between
portfolio managers by selling the current holdings and buying the portfolio
of the new managers using "baskets of shares".
A
Bumpy Flight!
Portfolio implementation programs could make it a bumpy flight for many
widely held Canadian stocks. The problem will be even more acute with
indexed investors who will probably implement derivative strategies using
the most liquid securities in the representative indices. While these
factors will not have a huge effect on the large global stocks in the
target indices, there could be substantial downwards pressure on many
Canadian large capitalization stocks that are large components of the
S&P TSX index.
Canadian resource companies and successful international operators will
be protected to some extent by their large foreign shareholdings and their
inclusion in foreign and global stock indices. In the current hot commodity
markets, foreign investors and even foreign acquirers will keep the valuations
on these Canadian companies comparable to their global peers. Largely
domestic Canadian companies could have to raise their dividend yield to
protect their share prices.
The current plight of indexed investors and companies affected by the
foreign property changes is a little bit ironic, considering the move
from the more cyclical and commodity TSE 300 index in 2002 to the new
S&P TSX index which emphasizes more domestic and less cyclical stocks
than its predecessor. Bay Street's response to the Nortel fiasco of contracting
out the index construction to S&P now seems like an impending loss
in value for those indexed or "closet indexed" to the S&P
TSX index.
Canadian Fixed Income
Given the expected propensity of Canadian plan sponsors to invest in Canadian
dollar fixed income assets, we believe that the major change in the Canadian
bond market due to the removal of the FPL will be increased issuance by
foreign issuers. Canadian bond investors should be able to obtain lower
default risk for their portfolios at higher yields by investing in foreign
issuers. The preference for Canadian registered investors will be to obtain
this exposure in Canadian currency and interest rates due to the Canadian
nature of their fixed rate liabilities.
Large sophisticated Canadian investors such as financial institutions
already "asset swap" into foreign credits by hedging the foreign
currency and interest rate risk through the derivative markets. Registered
plan sponsors have been limited in their asset swaps under the FPR due
to their use of their foreign content exposure for their equity portfolios.
It is possible that Canadian pension plans will extend their fixed income
mandates into foreign issuers by allowing hedging back to Canadian interest
rate exposure. In buying foreign issues and hedging back into Canadian
interest rate exposures, the investor takes greater risks than the credit
risk of the particular issuer. Derivative hedging introduces exposure
to the pricing and liquidity of the swap markets and credit exposure to
the swap banks. In optimistic financial markets like the present ones,
the consensus dictates these risks are trivial.
Experience has shown that financial turmoil can cause severe dislocation
in these markets. The pricing and liquidity of these hedges means that
the average investment policy statements would consider the asset swaps
under the illiquid asset category which currently precludes many plans
from even participating in domestic private placement issues. This means
that Canadian plan sponsors will likely leave the headache of hedging
to the swap banks. We expect that financial intermediaries will bring
foreign issuers into the Canadian bond market and provide these issuers
with cheap funding in their native currencies. Global investment dealers
will propose Canadian dollar issues to clients when it is tactically cheap
funding for them. Canadian clients will buy foreign credits in Canadian
currency when their spreads are attractive compared to Canadian issuers
with the same credit rating.
Many Canadian bond investors are restricted by their client investment
policies to investing in A or higher rated bonds. The purchase of the
Canadian Bond Rating Service in 1999 by Standard and Poors meant the "harmonization"
of Canadian credit ratings to international standards. Many A rated Canadian
issuers were downgraded to BBB status. The shrinking pool of Canadian
A rated issuers led to an artificial demand for A rated Canadian credits.
This resulted in lower relative interest rates (tighter yield spreads)
for Canadian issuers than would otherwise be the case. As more foreign
issuers access the Canadian debt markets, domestic Canadian bond issuers
will pay more for their financings. We believe that the banks, utilities,
auto finance, provincial and municipal bonds will suffer by comparison
to their international peers.
There is also a considerable diversification aspect to consider. Many
"core" Canadian fixed income managers have made a good living
by holding large amounts of bank subordinated debt and more recently the
capital securities (essentially preferred shares) of all five major banks.
At 8-10% per issuer, these managers have held 40-50% of their portfolios
in Canadian banks. This has given them additional yield to outperform
the bond market indices but speaks volumes of the exposure of this sector
to more highly rated foreign alternatives. While it might have seemed
unreasonable for plan sponsors to limit exposure to the Canadian bank
sector under the FPR, it might now seem a bit quaint not to limit this
exposure.
A reasonable question to be asked is why would foreign issuers find it
cheap to issue in Canada? The answer is that Canadian fixed income investors
will have a substantial pool of investment capital seeking foreign issuers
in Canadian dollars. When it is attractive funding, given relative credit
spreads and swap spreads, investment bankers will earn ample fees by meeting
the demand. The Canadian boom in Income Trust issuance is a shining example
of the juxtaposition of demand and investment banking bonuses.
As opposed to their Canadian equity portfolio management brethren, Canadian
bond managers should do reasonably well after the FPL is removed. Foreign
issuers will come and go in Canadian dollars depending on the attractiveness
of the swapped cost to them in their local currencies. Foreigners will
still buy and sell Canadian dollar bonds depending on their currency outlook.
The large pool of long-term Canadian dollar investment capital will still
be managed by those with experience and expertise in the Canadian dollar
debt markets.
As foreign issuance in Canadian dollars fluctuates with funding costs
and foreign investors move in and out of Canadian dollar debt, the result
will be more volatility of credit spreads. This means more profit opportunities
for the more skilled and active portfolio managers. The increased number
and variety of issuers suggest that credit and valuation skills will increasingly
be in demand from plan sponsors.
Lower Profits for Canadian Banks
The removal of the FPL is an overall negative for the profitability of
Canadian investment dealers and their bank parents. Canadian investment
dealers have a significant advantage in underwriting Canadian equity issues
for sale to Canadian clients because of their superior contacts with both
Canadian issuers and clients. The poor showing of international dealers
like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley in the Canadian market in the 1990s
is testament to this. Their global reach was not compensation for their
lack of a Canadian distribution network. Most closed their Canadian operations
after being shut out of domestic underwriting and now cover Canadian clients
from
New York.
Reduced demand for Canadian equities from Canadian investors will mean
lower equity underwriting and trading revenues for Canadian investment
dealers because it is unlikely to be replaced by increased foreign equity
trading and underwriting by Canadian dealers. As we discussed above, Canadian
institutional investors are likely to continue to use their established
foreign investment managers for their increased foreign equity portfolios.
These foreign investment managers will continue to purchase and trade
their foreign equities through the larger international dealers and stock
exchanges.
Canadian investment banks should seek to expand their foreign equity underwriting
and trading capacities to compensate for the reduction in their Canadian
revenues. This has historically been a difficult road for Canadian investment
banks. When a Canadian company issues equity in foreign markets, it usually
chooses a large international investment bank as the lead manager to access
their large international distribution network. Foreign companies seldom
use a Canadian investment dealer to issue equity to foreigners for the
same reason. Canadian investment banks have had a troubled record in international
expansions. Given the entrenched and dominant positions of the major international
investment banks, they are usually forced into dubious acquisitions, risky
business areas and questionable staffing. The 1990s foray of CIBC into
the United States and the RBC-DS London based Enron financings come to
mind. The removal of the FPR will mean increased participation in foreign
equity underwritings by Canadian dealers for their retail distribution
networks, but they will likely take a less lucrative and subordinate role
in the underwriting syndicate than in domestic Canadian deals.
In the Canadian debt markets, the advantage of the Canadian investment
dealers has been overwhelming. With their superior corporate and investment
banking relationships with Canadian domestic issuers, they have dominated
domestic Canadian debt issuance.
The repeal of the FPR will mean more foreign issuers will issue debt in
Canadian currency when it is advantageous. The key relationship will be
the contacts in the treasury areas of prospective issuers. Clearly, international
dealers with global investment banking contacts will be superior in this
regard.
Some Canadian dealers have developed excellent Eurobond operations, which
issue foreign currency bonds to European investors. These dealers have
essentially sold Canadian dollar debt to foreigners. These operations
have also given them the capability to underwrite issues in other currencies
such as the New Zealand and Australian dollar for sale in to European
investors. These Canadian dealers lack the extensive network of global
investment banks but they do have the contacts with Canadian clients.
This should help them develop the contacts with potential Canadian dollar
issuers.
Conclusion
The repeal of the FPR is a bold move that will permit Canadian investors
to maximize their investment returns at a lower level of risk. The timing
of the move is politically and financially astute, as it comes when Canadian
financial assets are in demand by foreign investors. This should hopefully
remove some of the upwards pressure on the Canadian dollar and help to
ease the adjustment for Canadian investors and issuers. The captive demand
under the FPR for the securities of many Canadian issuers will disappear
and could lead to sharp downwards pricing pressure on some Canadian stocks
and bonds. It will eventually raise financing costs for Canadian issuers
and will likely reduce the profitability of the Canadian financial sector.
Given an extensive consultative process, we imagine that the complete
removal of the FPR would have provoked a massive lobbying effort against
it by those negatively affected, especially the Canadian banking sector.
The shocking speed of this development and the strong political support
for the budget in a minority Parliament makes it very likely to pass.
In any event, the political picture is fairly obvious: "Voters happy
with unlimited foreign content in their RRSPs versus helping the big banks?"
The new Canadian investment reality is here to stay. Thoughtful investors
will seize the opportunities created by the removal of the FPR and protect
their portfolios from the downside.
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